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This paper examines humanitarianism’s moral positioning above private and political interests 
to save lives and alleviate suffering. It does not aim to assess the legitimacy of this stance, but 
rather to probe the way in which humanitarian actors relate to this moral dimension in their every-
day work. It investigates empirically humanitarian ethics from the perspective of humanitarian 
actors, drawing on interviews conducted in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2014. As it is exploratory, three 
key conceptual innovations were required. The first of these is the introduction of the tools devel-
oped to consider a neglected reality: humanitarian actors’ ‘moral sense’ vis-à-vis the humanitarian 
sector’s ‘moral culture’. Second, the study shows how the sector’s moral culture is structured around 
the notion of ‘concern for persons in need’. Third, it analyses the way in which the sector and 
its actors handle the asymmetrical relationships encountered daily. Ultimately this paper seeks 
to valorise humanitarian actors’ creativity in their common practices and explore potential chal-
lenges to it.
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Introduction
What is morality, if not the practice of liberty, the deliberate practice of liberty?
—Michel Foucault, cited in Fornet-Betancourt, Becker, and Gomez-Müller (1987, p. 115). 
There is no axiological neutrality in humanitarianism. From the outset the humani-
tarian sector stands in the sphere of ethics: located above private and political interests, 
with the aim of saving lives and alleviating suffering in a time of crisis.1 This paper 
is not concerned with assessing the actual morality of the humanitarian enterprise, but 
rather with exploring the way in which humanitarian actors relate to this ethical 
dimension in their everyday work. As such, it addresses an area of research that thus 
far has been left unscrutinised by contemporary studies on humanitarian action: the 
moral experience of humanitarian actors. It does so by investigating empirically 
humanitarian ethics from their perspective, drawing on 37 interviews conducted in 
Beirut, Lebanon, in June 2014.
 This study on the ethical dimension of humanitarian actors’ lived experience appears 
timely. Indeed, since the 1990s, the sector has been going through an immense pro-
cess of professionalisation, contributing assuredly to the enhancement of its quality 
and effectiveness. Some of its associated challenges, though, are increasingly pressing 
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today, such as the problem of ‘proceduralization’ (Anderson, Brown, and Jean, 2012, 
p. 65) and ‘“mechanization” of humanitarianism’ (Brauman, 2004, p. 415). This con-
text is making it crucial that humanitarian actors do not lose sight of the ultimate 
goal: the humanitarian telos—that is, to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect and 
maintain human dignity.
 In addition, at a time when the humanitarian sector is seeking to ‘re-inspire and 
reignite our common humanity’ (World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat, 2015, p. iv) 
and to provide tools for an improved humanitarian ethics (Mattei, 2014; Slim, 2015), 
it is essential to appraise the meaning of these norms and moral aspirations in the 
actual motivations and experiences of humanitarian actors. To do so, this paper looks 
at ethics in humanitarian work in its experiential and subjective dimension, what is 
called here ‘moral sense’. 
 As this is an exploratory piece of work, three key conceptual innovations were 
required. The first of these is the introduction of the analytical tools developed to 
probe this new research object, derived from literature in the realms of philosophy 
and social sciences. In addition, the particular aspect of ethics at stake is defined and 
‘moral sense’ is distinguished from ‘moral culture’. Next the study shows how the 
humanitarian sector’s moral culture is structured around the key notion of ‘care for 
people in need’. Finally, it analyses the way in which the sector and its actors handle 
the asymmetrical relationships encountered daily. 
Conceptual framework
A customary notion of ethics
The ethics or morality at stake here originates in the Greek tradition and is increas-
ingly attracting philosophers once again (Anscombe, 1958; Macintyre, 1982; Foucault, 
1988; Glover, 2001). It is grounded in these two notions’ common etymological root 
in the idea of ‘customs’—that is, ēthikos in Greek and moralis in Latin. The etymology 
points to the fundamental embeddedness of morality in a particular cultural context, 
in the same way that it is recognised to be the case for eating and parenting habits. 
As a result, it can be analysed only from within a broader social environment. This 
conception of ethics moves away from the ‘law conception of ethics’ (Anscombe, 
1958, p. 6) centred on the notion of justice (such as in the moral philosophy of John 
Rawls). In this legislative model, the ‘moral philosopher proposes a particular point 
of view on a normative question, in the similar way as the lawyer does’ (Reber, 
2011, p. 10).2 The present approach, by contrast, calls for ethics to be brought ‘back 
to its own ground’—that of ordinary practices—and requires therefore an ‘immanent 
examination of our moral practices’ (Laugier, 2001, pp. 100–101).3 
 This empirical approach to ethics is at the core of Didier Fassin’s demand for a 
‘moral anthropology’, which ‘explores how societies ideologically and emotionally 
found their cultural distinction between good and evil, and how social agents con-
cretely work out this separation in their everyday life’ (Fassin, 2008, p. 334). In the 
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context of this paper, the society is the humanitarian sector and social agents are 
humanitarian actors. Hugo Slim’s research on humanitarian ethics is also a major 
influence on this study, in particular the idea that ‘declamatory principles’ are not 
sufficient; it is also essential to evaluate the sector’s ‘applied ethics’ (Slim, 2015, p. 21). 
Consequently, rather than a prescriptive conception of ethics that seeks to deter-
mine the right way of applying rationally determined norms and values, this paper 
is interested in a notion of ethics that starts from recognition of one’s practical and 
embodied engagement in the world. It draws from the social sciences to engage with 
the reality of the humanitarian sector in terms of its complexity and plurality. 
Empirical material
The 2015 edition of the State of the Humanitarian System estimated that there were 
approximately 319,000 humanitarian workers worldwide in 2014 (ALNAP, 2015, p. 39). 
In light of the limited number of interviews conducted, this research does not pretend 
to be representative of the diverse humanitarian community as a whole. Rather, its 
intention is to open a field of research that has been neglected so far: the moral sense 
of humanitarian actors. Indeed, as anthropologists of aid work have shown recently, 
‘in applied and professional literature on development as well as critical anthropol-
ogy, aid workers have largely been invisible’ (Hindman and Fechter, 2011, p. 3). This 
can also be said of the literature on humanitarian assistance, aside from some note-
worthy exceptions (Slim, 1995; Walkup, 1997; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010; Barnett, 
2011; Redfield, 2013). The agency of aid workers is an area that remains particularly 
unexamined in humanitarian studies.4 It is nonetheless interesting to note the grow-
ing pool of research on humanitarian ethics founded on the experiences, perspectives, 
and practices of humanitarian actors (Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002; Schwartz 
et al., 2010; Hunt, 2011; Bouvier, 2012; Slim, 2015). This paper seeks to contribute to 
this body of work.
 The present study is based, as noted, on 37 interviews with humanitarian actors 
conducted in Beirut in June 2014. Interviewees were recruited using snowball sam-
pling, and interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, were conducted in English 
or French, and were recorded when respondents agreed to it. The sample is com-
posed of 16 nationalities, including 19 individuals from non-OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, 14 of whom are Lebanese or 
Syrian. Men and women are represented almost equally. Within their organisations 
they hold roles at different levels of the hierarchy, from heads of regional or country 
offices to recently appointed assistants. The interviewees are from the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (13), international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (11), United Nations (UN) or governmental agencies (10), 
and local organisations (3). Most of them (35 of 37) were working as part of the 
response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict in Syria that followed the 
civil revolution in 2011. All but one were based in Beirut or in neighbouring areas—
the exception was in Amman, Jordan, and interviewed via Skype. Interviews were 
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semi-structured and followed a series of questions around three themes initially 
identified as potentially ethically relevant: motivations; relationships; and decision-
making. Interviews were transcribed and analysed with the help of NVivo5 qualita-
tive analysis software.
Spoken words versus speaking words
Some precaution was required in handling the material collected in the interviews. 
Since the interviews enquired about aspirations and experiences, they touched on 
personal matters—that is, aspects of us that are intimately tied to who we are. As the 
Austrian theorist Friedrich Waismann (2000, p. 262) warns, it is not possible simply 
to say: ‘here I am, and here are my motives’. The content of what is expressed is 
always partial, not only because a person might wish to hide or modify certain 
elements, but also because there are features of experiences and motivations that one 
is simply not able to make the object of reflection. Furthermore, the field of expe-
riences and motivations generally comes with a certain degree of vagueness. Yet, as 
Waismann (2000, p. 263) adds, ‘by putting it into words – words that have a precise 
meaning’, one might ‘eliminate something of its own indeterminacy’, and ‘alter it’ 
in that sense.
 Nonetheless, many respondents appeared rather determinate and resolute in talking 
about their experiences and motivations. Most likely they had already had conversa-
tions on these topics with colleagues, friends, or relatives. It was indeed perceptible 
that many of the responses heard were a repetition of words already spoken before. 
One interviewee even acknowledged that, ‘when I explain these things, I have two 
ways of explaining this . . . the simple answer . . . and the other one that has more 
to do with my personal experience’. What does this imply for the present analysis?
 French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 229) distinguishes between 
two different ways of expressing oneself that capture well the different nature of the 
answers of the interviewees: ‘spoken words’ versus ‘speaking words’. Spoken words 
are those already said before; through their continuous repetition they eventually go 
through a process of ‘sedimentation’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 150). Speaking words, 
in contrast, reveal something that has never been said before. A new and untold 
meaning emerges in speaking words. The present tense reveals a language that is 
alive and creative, as opposed to the past tense that is a retelling of already existing 
meanings. This study pays particular attention to these two types of language as they 
help to identify two different aspects of morality defined below.6
Moral culture versus moral sense 
Spoken words point to what is called here the ‘moral culture’. This paper concen-
trates on the culture of the humanitarian sector more generally.7 A culture includes 
a number of dominant characteristics of a particular environment that determine to 
some degree the behaviours of individuals. As such, moral culture refers in this study 
to a notion of morality that shapes the ‘moral sense’ of individuals. It shares some 
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similarities with what Hugo Slim (1997, p. 246) calls ‘organisational conscience’, 
but slightly differs from it as it comes with a certain degree of imposition by the 
organisation on the individual actor. It gives ground to prescriptive claims and 
expected behaviours, that is, what one should do and think. This manifested in the 
interviews when respondents did not answer from their own lived experience. While 
asked about what is—their actual feelings, aspirations, or relationships to others—
they would rather say what they think should be in these matters: what one should feel, 
should aspire to, and how one should relate to others. All of the tensions and ambi-
guities of experience would be lost. A first intention of this paper is to render visible 
this moral culture to make sure it does not escape the scope of critique in an alleged 
‘“sacred” realm’ (Hopgood, 2008, p. 99). 
 The second notion of morality with which this study is interested is the one that 
emerges in ‘speaking words’ and which has been linked to ‘moral sense’. This notion, 
borrowed from eighteenth century moral sense theorists (Adam Smith, David Hume, 
Francis Hutcheson, or the third Earl of Shaftesbury), points to the experiential level 
in moral life. Rather than being imposed on the individual, this aspect of morality is 
more aspirational, creative, and embodied. 
 These two different modes of expressing oneself were generally perceptible in the 
interviews. Through the use of this distinction between moral sense (in speaking 
words) as opposed to moral culture (in spoken words), this paper avoids at the same 
time the strictly descriptive ‘mapping’ of humanitarian morality on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the judgemental position of a ‘rough normativism’ distantly assessing the 
morality or immorality of particular practices and behaviours (Reber, 2011, p. 45).8 
 Having laid out the conceptual framework, two findings of particular interest 
are presented: the first relates to the humanitarian founding motivation identified as 
‘concern for the person in need’ and the second touches on the question of relation-
ships within humanitarian practices. 
Concern for the person in need
Normative axis
The discourse of humanitarian organisations is essentially centred on a sense of 
‘concern for the person in need’, an expression borrowed from Tony Vaux (2001, 
p. 2). According to Vaux (2001), ‘concern for the person in need’ is precisely the 
main objective of humanitarian aid; it constitutes its core principle: the principle 
of humanity. In the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS 
Alliance, Groupe URD, and the Sphere Project, 2014, p. 2), this concern takes the 
shape of the ‘humanitarian imperative – the desire to prevent and alleviate human 
suffering wherever it happens’. 
 The main aim of this section is not to evaluate the authenticity of the claim as to 
whether humanitarian actors are effectively primarily driven by concern for the 
person in need. Rather, it seeks to explore how actors relate to this first normative 
axis: an experience of concern for a person in need. 
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Motivations
Interviewees expressed a wide range of reasons that have led them to work for a 
humanitarian organisation. Motives mentioned included technical interests, in particu-
lar for specialists such as engineers, healthcare professionals, or lawyers. Humanitarians 
with a specific professional skill mentioned an interest in the challenges posed by 
the humanitarian context to these professions. Other actors referred to looking for 
an income-generating activity. This motive was preponderant for locally contracted 
employees. Among expatriates, the international environment was a frequently men-
tioned incentive. Many indeed showed interest in discovering new cultures, languages, 
and people. And of course, the desire to help people in need was also cited considerably. 
 For a number of interviewees, the possibility of actually doing something with 
their concern constituted in itself a strong motivational driver to work in the humani-
tarian sector. For some it was dissatisfaction with other forms of professional activities 
that did not respond to people in need that led them to engage in humanitarian work. 
One interviewee saw humanitarian work as a form of ‘refuge’ from the inaction and 
lack of real impact of his previous profession, and the deep frustrations he used to feel. 
Thanks to the shift to humanitarian work, he said:
I feel better, I feel much better. More useful, as simple as that . . . it is a matter of impact, 
it is not about the thrills of the adventure. . . . I am not interested in that at all . . . the 
idea is to do something that has an impact.9
 Another person described it as a way to respond to a widespread dissatisfaction 
towards the state of things in general and in particular in her own country Lebanon:
I see all my Lebanese friends being so provoked by everything that is going on, let’s say, 
in terms of conflict. And then you know, one questions oneself, ‘what can you do?’. I think 
I’ve chosen what to do, in order to answer this question somehow.
 It became obvious that respondents related to their various motivations differently. 
A majority of them assessed their motives on the basis of their specific moral worth, 
determined by the extent to which they would show concern for the person in need. 
This materialised, for instance, in the way in which some interviewees felt that they 
had to confess the fact that their choice had also been motivated by other elements than 
this concern. They pointed out, for example:
So basically, to be really honest, it was initially the desire to work abroad.10
In my country, our job employment is very low, so honestly, I joined just to seek employment. 
 They would also judge as unworthy motives that did not have the person in need 
at the heart. All other motivational elements were mentioned in comparison to this 
expected primary reason. They would refer to them as ‘egoistic’ or ‘selfish’, among 
other things. According to one respondent, senior in his organisation, motivations 
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become ‘healthier with time’, less ‘tied to your ego’ and hence increasingly more 
focused on the person in need. 
 The health or goodness of a motive has therefore to do with the way it is other-
directed as opposed to fulfilling self-interests. In other words, actors should be pri-
marily driven by concern for persons in need.11 As Stephen Hopgood (2008, p. 113) 
puts it, ‘the self-interested, the nonsolidaristic, need not apply’. Only a few respond-
ents did not refer to this concern for the person in need among their initial influ-
encing factors. If it was not among an individual’s original calculations, it seemed as 
if a justification was required. For instance, one interviewee clearly recognised that 
it had played no role in her decision to apply for a position in a humanitarian organi-
sation. This in itself was so special that it dominated a large part of the interview. 
 This trait of the humanitarian moral culture also became evident in the way in 
which some interviewees explicitly and forcefully rejected this moral expectation upon 
them. Some had a great reaction to it, if not repulsion. For example, one respondent 
stated that:
it was not the desire to help, I would not put it like this, the desire to meet and see how 
they live and eventually you can do something. But not to change the world. Stupid.
 Some respondents refused to comply with a particular culture of good intentions 
and took an opposite stance, that of cynicism or irony, as is perceptible in the quota-
tion above. They claimed that this altruistic concern had played no part whatsoever 
and that it is actually hypocritical and futile.
 Other respondents did not necessarily have a highly critical opinion of the humani-
tarian moral culture but underlined explicitly other motives than those rooted in 
concern for the person in need. In particular, they emphasised the specifically tech-
nical aspect of their role in the humanitarian sector. In several cases it was clear that 
this reason was given precisely to contrast with the dominant culture of concern 
highlighted above.
Evolution of motivations
The interviews made it clear that initial concern for persons in need (or its absence 
at first) evolves through experience of working in the humanitarian sector. One of 
the Lebanese interviewees became interested in working for a humanitarian organi-
sation because she felt it would offer her a ‘normal’ working environment, as she 
put it, in contrast to her previous profession in the hotel trade in which she had par-
ticularly challenging hours of employment. While working for her humanitarian 
organisation, though, she developed a deep interest in and respect for the work done 
on behalf of the communities in need, and no longer sees it as a ‘normal’ job. She 
pointed out that:
actually now after a few years of working with [X] . . . you really get into the really 
humanitarian work, although I don’t deal with victims. . . . But from the programme that 
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we have, and you see the suffering of the people so you really appreciate the work. . . . 
I usually stay over and over. And you are really happy to do this. Of what you can achieve. 
When you see this, it’s really good. 
 Another respondent who initially became involved with a humanitarian organi-
sation because he was seeking employment said that, after a few years of being a 
humanitarian, it is ‘more than a job now’. He recalled in particular the strong impact 
that one of his first humanitarian missions had on him: 
I was sent there to support some of the Afghan refugees, and they completely changed my 
approach toward my life, toward my work.
 This change was prompted by contact with people in need who made him realise 
the value of the endeavour. 
 However, there can also be a move away from initial concern for the person in 
need. Such a testimony often was linked to a sense of ‘losing one’s illusions’, as one 
interviewee put it, that one had on starting work in the humanitarian sector. In par-
ticular these illusions pertained to the nature of the initial motivation (such as by 
questioning its authenticity) or to the possibility of actually helping people in need. 
A certain degree of cynicism was pregnant in such a perspective. For instance, a staff 
member of an international organisation queried the very legitimacy of humani-
tarian aid:
we think that we are here to support and do something that is valuable, but really, we are 
not needed. If an agency is good, and if the work you are doing is good, you are supposed 
to decrease, no? But we are increasing budget, increasing staff, increasing number of people 
. . . there’s something wrong. 
 Statements pointing to the fact that, ultimately, humanitarian action was simply a 
business like any other frequently accompanied this standpoint:
it’s definitely a business and I don’t like this. This is probably one of the things that I 
dislike most. . . . You see a lot of people with good will, and with good spirit, but, at the 
larger scale, it’s really business.
 Claiming that the humanitarian sector is a business like any other comes down 
to saying that self-interest, and no longer the person in need, is the core driver.12 
 As this section has shown, concern for the person in need clearly constitutes a moral 
point of reference for discussing the motivations of humanitarian actors. Humanitarian 
moral culture appears to be built on this concern; and it is around this concern that 
the moral sense of humanitarian actors is articulated. 
 On the basis of this identified expected concern for the person in need, the follow-
ing section probes the various relationships that develop within humanitarian work. 
In particular, how is the moral sense of a humanitarian actor shaped by being in rela-
tion to people in need? 
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Humanitarian relationships
Moral culture towards vulnerability
The next element analysed pertains to dealing with a person in need. Also identified 
here is a particularly strong set of moral expectations regarding how a humanitarian 
actor should relate to and feel and think about crisis-affected people. When inter-
viewees were asked about how they actually relate to these communities, their responses 
frequently were about how a humanitarian actor should relate to them. This is clearly 
an example of what is identified above as spoken words revealing a particular moral 
culture. The following quote points to this dimension precisely:
I think I have a lot of sympathy . . . because I’m trying to bear in mind always that even 
if it’s not a refugee by definition that I would be talking to, it’s still someone who has had 
some reasons to leave his or her country, which is normally the last thing that you do, if 
you are not forced to it. . . . So I feel it’s very important to show that respect to persons. 
I think it takes a lot before someone approaches an agency to ask for assistance to be able 
to pay rent, or to buy food, so I think that in itself merits some respect from us.
 The extensive use of ‘I think’ in this quotation reveals that these words are more 
the products of a particular moral culture than the expression of lived experience.13 
In addition to this expected attitude on beneficiaries, the humanitarian sector appears 
to be characterised by a general discomfort of the power asymmetries within which 
it operates. This embarrassment is perceptible, for example, in a critique by Barbara 
Harrell-Bond (2002, p. 68) of humanitarian ‘charity’ and its ‘power to decide who 
is deserving’. An approach towards power asymmetries in the sector actually entails 
simply denying their existence. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2010, p. 104) 
researchers noted, for instance, that: 
We began this paper reflecting on the struggle of many dedicated humanitarians to address 
and overcome what they often see as an inevitable and inherent inequality between them-
selves and those they hope to help. From what we have heard through listening, however, 
it would seem that there is no inevitable and inherent inequality.
 On the contrary, this paper wishes to stress that there actually is an ‘inevitable and 
inherent inequality’ in any helping relationships. This inequality is composed of 
capacities, that is, humanitarian resources and competencies, to respond to the needs 
and vulnerability of crisis-affected individuals and communities. Indeed, any helping 
relationship is structured on the identification of needs on the side of the helped (a 
minus) and of skills and resources to respond to needs on the side of the helper (a plus). 
Frédéric Worms (2010, p. 19) describes this as the ‘profound and constitutive asym-
metry of the caring relationship’.14 It is essential to underscore the existence of this 
capacity–vulnerability relationship to avoid the risks that this asymmetry poses to 
helping practices. In the following subsection this paper pinpoints the two main 
structural risks of the helping relationship and then assesses the way in which humani-
tarian actors respond to them. 
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 Finally, it is important to note that this description of humanitarian relationships 
centred on two terms (humanitarians and beneficiaries) is a simplification of the reality. 
Actors such as donors, the national staff of international organisations, the person-
nel of national organisations, and refugee volunteers challenge this binary model. 
Further research is necessary to study how this more complex reality shapes the 
constitutive asymmetry of the aid relationship and its potential risks. Hilhorst et al. 
(2012), for example, point to the role of ‘active beneficiaries’. However, the present 
analysis, based on the relationship between a helper and a helped and the potentially 
associated risks to this relationship, remains pertinent and useful in evaluating any 
activity of help, including humanitarian action. 
The two risks of abuse
The humanitarian sector has produced numerous regulatory documents to frame its 
action and to avoid the risks inherent to its practice, in particular those related to the 
inherent power asymmetries between humanitarian actors and crisis-affected com-
munities.15 These normative documents are important and useful to the humani-
tarian sector and to the other actors with which it engages. A closer analysis of the 
intrinsic dangers of the relation of help in humanitarianism is necessary, though, to 
help the sector avoid the risks. 
 As Frédéric Worms (2010, p. 9) shows, the constitutive asymmetry of the helping 
relationship can lead to two different negative scenarios: (i) an abuse of power; and 
(ii) a lack of recognition. The interviews made it clear that these two risks posed 
continuous challenges to the moral culture and moral sense of humanitarian actors. 
 An abuse of power by humanitarian actors over beneficiaries is perceptible when 
actors lose the sense that humanitarian work is not addressed at an object, but at a 
subject, a human being. As Hugo Slim (2015, p. 213) underlines, ‘the potential for 
humanitarian action to degrade into unethical authoritarian structures, insulting 
discourse and unfeeling managerialism is a constant challenge’. One interviewee 
feared ‘mechanical’ attitudes towards assisted individuals and communities, whereas 
another was deeply aware of the risk of relationships becoming only ‘functional’ or 
‘utilitarian’. A number of professionals interviewed mentioned their fears of losing 
track of the individual human beings behind the numbers that they were handling 
daily on their computers. Interviewees also identified the risk of showing disrespect 
in the delivery of aid. One of them expressed concern about potentially ‘humiliating 
moments’, especially during forms of assistance that aim to help a large number of 
people, such as food distributions. He said that these activities require much ‘vigilance’ 
by humanitarian actors. The fear of being ‘patronising’ was made clear too. An inter-
viewee said that, in her experience, beneficiaries were not recognised and respected 
as ‘human beings’.
 The second form of abuse that Worms highlights, a lack of recognition of the role 
of the helper, is the opposite of the aforementioned abuse. One interviewee noted, 
for instance, a case of refugees questioning the legitimacy of his presence in a particu-
lar situation, as he could not do anything to help the people he was there to assist:
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So I had a lot of complaints . . . people were asking me: ‘So what can you do now? How 
can you help me now?’ And I had to say: ‘sorry, I cannot do anything at this particular 
moment’. But then they say: ‘So why you are here?’ [And I would be thinking:] ‘Yes 
actually, it is a good question, I don’t know why I am here’, but you can’t say things like 
that. So you try to be patient and explain it more.
 In this case the humanitarian actor felt that his very function was being ques-
tioned. His role itself was unrecognised; he was simply useless in the eyes of the 
people that he was there to help. Furthermore, in this situation, he actually came to 
question himself his own legitimacy. To the question posed by the beneficiary, ‘why 
are you here?’, he admitted that, indeed, ‘I don’t know why I am here’. 
 Yet, when evoking experiences of a lack of recognition, respondents would mostly 
blame their management. Managers generally would be cited as those responsible for 
not acknowledging the work done. For example, one interviewee felt that the senior 
management did ‘not care at all’ about the quality of the work:
the senior management, they focus a lot on numbers and processes . . . and since they are 
not working with the persons of concern, it’s easier for them to focus on these numbers. 
 Another interviewee, while discussing the organisation that she was working with 
before, pointed out that:
you feel your work here no one cares. I remember being in Pakistan and really pushing for 
something to happen for a massive Afghan population, and people were like, totally unin-
terested to hear what I had to say.
 It is interesting to note in these two quotations the accusation of carelessness on 
the part of the managers. Although staff members are expected to demonstrate a 
sense of concern (as shown above), they would express resentment towards managers 
who would not exhibit the same degree of care and did not recognise the effort staff 
members put into their work. 
 Furthermore, this sense of a lack of recognition of one’s work was particularly pre-
sent among national staff members. Some felt that the very structure of humanitarian 
organisations was ‘discriminatory’ towards nationally contracted personnel, in the 
words of a Syrian interviewee. She stated that:
The international staff is better treated. They are protected by the management. Lot of 
international staff don’t go to the field. They don’t listen. They just ask for information.
 Such a perspective echoes that reported by Listening Program researchers with 
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (Anderson, Brown, and Jean, 2012) and in a 
study of Lebanese national aid workers by Zakharia and Knox (2014).
 Figure 1 summarises the risks in the relationship between humanitarian actors and 
affected communities.
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Limits of one’s power
The power–vulnerability dynamic in the humanitarian context also shapes the moral 
sense of actors. The majority of respondents cited having to refuse assistance to people 
in need among the most challenging aspects of their role. This is clear in the follow-
ing quotation:
when you can’t meet the needs, it’s really difficult because you are close to them, you know 
names, you get to know families, the kids, you go to visit the camps, and they approach 
you. And you have to say I can’t, that kills you, that kills you.
 The ability to handle the limits of one’s individual and organisational capacity to 
respond to needs was a sign of professional maturity. As one experienced humani-
tarian actor put it:
you see that it is needed, but you cannot. But you learn, with experience, you accept.
 Another took a similar stance:
I think that difficult choices must be addressed in a constructive manner. There must be a 
questioning of the programme, of the validity of the programme and how we are going forward.
 Organisations have elaborated guidelines defining the target population or the par-
ticular focus of a specific mission. As one senior manager explained, these protocols 
Figure 1. Risks in the relationship between humanitarian actors and affected communities
Experience of  
disrespect and  
paternalism on the  
part of the ‘helped’
From the ‘helped’ From the managment
Helping relationship
Two potential risks
Concrete outcomes  
in the humanitarian 
sector
Given: 
constitutive asymmetry
Abuse of power
(towards the ‘helped’)
Lack of recognition
(towards the ‘helper’)
Source: author.
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not only have a strategic function, but also they are essential for those in direct con-
tact with the communities. In particular, they help to reduce stress:
it is extremely important for people in the first lines, in particular social workers, doctors, 
midwives, nurses that they have clear guidelines and procedures. . . . A doctor will always 
be in a particularly difficult situation toward a patient, he will always try to find a solu-
tion. That is very good but he has enough stress toward the patient that the protocol must 
be determined somewhere else.
 Another interviewee shared the profound frustration that she felt towards her 
organisation because it had not given her clear directions on the cases to include or 
exclude in the project. Her main dissatisfaction was that she felt that senior manage-
ment was leaving too much decision-making to the implementers of the programme. 
She said that this ‘made workers very nervous’ in that regularly they had to decide 
themselves whether or not they should take responsibility for a particular individual 
in need. She added that:
I feel super angry. . . . Lack of support, lack of clarity internally, in the end my staff has 
to be the one to convene information to the people they work with and they don’t feel solid 
about what their stance is. . . . I feel powerless. It is very frustrating.
 Another respondent also mentioned the importance of those implementing pro-
grammes being convinced of their value and knowing their limits. He emphasised 
that this is essential when explaining to people why they cannot receive assistance 
through a particular agency or programme:
the idea is to be the most transparent possible, explain the reasons, don’t talk to people as 
if they were dumb. . . . The best way to convince them is to be convinced yourself.
 A senior manager highlighted the significance of obtaining ‘buy-in’ from his staff 
to ensure cohesion and trust within the organisation. It is vital for the organisation as 
a whole to adhere to the same objectives in such a way that its aims are not perceived 
as imposed from above; rather they are seen as the right thing to do. In other words, 
a certain degree of consensus as to the limits of one’s capacity as an organisation to 
respond to identified needs and vulnerabilities is essential. 
 The above has focused on power asymmetry in humanitarian relationships, yet 
there is more to these relations than a power imbalance. This is the topic of the last 
subsection, which examines the sense of being useful.
Sense of being useful
Interviews pointed to the particular importance of the sense of being useful. What 
is at stake here is what Joan Tronto (1993, p. 108) calls the ‘care-receiving’ phase of 
the caring process, which is an essential element as ‘it provides the only way to know 
that caring needs have actually been met’. Clearly there is a utilitarian value present 
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here, which is well recognised in the humanitarian sector as it provides feedback on 
the effectiveness and quality of the response. However, there is another aspect that 
goes beyond the strictly utilitarian level that deserves much more attention than it 
has received so far. It is the sense of one’s efficiency and effectiveness. That one’s 
actions actually make a difference indeed appeared to be particularly important to 
interviewees. One respondent stated that:
it remains a very positive feedback loop . . . you really felt in people’s lives something 
positive happened for them, a very positive change and it was so obvious, so clear, so 
wonderful to be involved in someone’s positive life change.
 The importance of this aspect was also made clear when interviewees expressed 
their frustration with the absence of a sense of usefulness. This appeared particularly 
problematic in large organisations, as can be perceived in the following quotation:
coming from a smaller organisation [and] going to the big, one of the things I completely 
felt frustrating is just the giant bureaucracy in which you feel like you can have wonder-
ful ideas but you can’t make changes. At the level where I was at, I was not listened to. 
. . . I would feel up against this massive bureaucracy and just ineffectual.
 The capacity to remain motivated without necessarily receiving feedback was a 
sign of professional maturity and a means of remaining continuously alert and critical 
of the system in which one is functioning. The same respondent added:
part of me [now] is comfortable enough with the idea that you are not going to do some-
thing awesome everyday, I would say [that I have this feeling of being ineffectual] once 
a week. . . . I’m kind of okay with that most of the time, because . . . if you think that you 
are doing something wonderful all the time, then you are not being critical enough of the 
system that we work in.
 Some activities, such as psychosocial support, appeared to provide a rewarding sense 
of having an effect more directly. One interviewee commented that: 
you get almost immediate feedback, you don’t have to wait for a few month or a year.
 Several respondents noted the link between the level of responsibility within the 
organisation and the possibility of receiving feedback on one’s action. The fact that 
the higher one goes in the hierarchy, the less one engages with crisis-affected com-
munities and individuals was mentioned several times as an issue for those who had 
acquired senior positions in their organisations. One interviewee said that: 
unfortunately with time, the more you go up in an organisation, the further away you are 
from the field, which is really too bad because ultimately, we do this work to be close to 
people and it is true that we are less and less . . . and it is true that I miss it.
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 Although missing contact with recipient communities and individuals, humanitar-
ian actors at a management level appreciated that their activities had a wider bearing. 
There appeared to be challenges to one’s sense of being effectual at each level of 
responsibility. As one interviewee remarked:
If you are working with individuals you feel like ‘oh, I’m only helping one person, such 
a tiny drop’. . . . And then you work on a big scale and you don’t feel the impact because 
you don’t have personal contact with the people . . . feeling ineffectual on either end of 
the scale, that’s really hard.
 However, people find ways to navigate this absence of relations with affected com-
munities and individuals, which were, for many interviewees, part of their initial 
motivation for becoming involved in humanitarian activities. Some said that they 
would try to go to the field and meet the beneficiaries as much as possible, even 
though their role did not necessarily require it. In the words of one:
I do try to escape and go to the field sometimes. You renew your energies. You try to talk 
to your team, and let them tell you what happened, what they thought, what they felt. 
How are they doing. That makes you feel closer. . . . You see what they do and it’s amaz-
ing. And you are like ‘yeah, that’s why I’m here’.
 Other respondents who did not have direct interaction with recipients of aid high-
lighted the importance of relations with colleagues in general. For instance, when 
asked what kept him motivated at work, one interviewee responded:
today, as a manager [of an international organisation], I am further and further away 
from the people we help, but to see my colleagues being enthusiastic, working together, 
doing things, succeeding, it thrills me, it really gives me enthusiasm . . . in the field you see 
people being treated, but that is not my daily environment, my daily environment is my team.
 The sense of being useful appeared not to be something extra, therefore. Actually 
it emerged as fundamental in acts of caring for others, both for utilitarian and non-
utilitarian reasons.
 Non-utilitarian reasons are close to what is meant when one talks about actions 
having a sense of meaning. A senior manager in particular emphasised the diffi-
culty she experiences after spending time away from the children with whom she 
works. She said that when she has to spend a couple of days fulfilling only manage-
rial tasks, such as attending meetings with various stakeholders or writing reports, at 
some point she feels ‘disconnected’ from the real issue. To counter this, she sits down 
with one of the children in her charge for a few minutes and listens to whatever he/
she wants to share with her at this point. That is enough for her to recover a sense 
of connection and meaningfulness and to keep going. This example points up the 
fundamental value of a sense of connection with the people with whom or on whose 
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behalf humanitarian actors work, not only for utilitarian reasons, but also to acquire 
a fundamental sense of meaning and value.
Conclusion
By claiming to be free from any private and political interests, the humanitarian 
sector locates itself in the domain of ethics. The aim of this study was not to assess 
the authenticity or legitimacy of this assertion, but rather to examine what this ethi-
cal drive and positioning means for actors, that is, how they shape their motivations 
and experiences during everyday work. There is descriptive value in this analysis 
to understand better humanitarian morality, yet, although it did not intend to for-
mulate prescriptive judgement on humanitarian action, this inquiry sought to go 
beyond mere description. To that end, the study introduced two different aspects of 
humanitarian morality: the moral culture of the humanitarian sector; and the moral 
sense of humanitarian actors. It evaluated these two sides of humanitarian morality 
with respect to two central elements: fundamental humanitarian motivation (that of 
concern for the person in need); and relationships within this realm. 
 The increasingly professionalised and bureaucratic humanitarian system makes this 
reflection particularly timely. The continuous trend of ‘proceduralization’ makes it 
increasingly difficult to engage creatively with the constantly changing environment 
and to confront potential risks of abuse. According to Fabrice Weissman (2015, p. 71), 
the ‘real danger’ for an organisation like Médecins Sans Frontières, much more than Daesh 
(so-called Islamic State) for instance, is the ever-growing bureaucracy. Furthermore, 
while one can praise the humanitarian sector for its production of normative docu-
ments, guidelines, and protocols to frame its practice and to improve its accountabil-
ity, effectiveness, and quality, one may be concerned that they amount merely to 
rhetorical statements of beliefs and principles, or simply ‘box ticking’. Even more 
worrying is that they might actually contribute to widening the gap between moral 
culture and the moral sense of individuals—that is, between discourses and expecta-
tions on the one hand and, on the other, actual practices and experiences.
 This paper has sought to highlight the moral agency of humanitarian actors using 
the notion of moral sense in contrast to a moral culture composed of particular nor-
mative expectations. It has pointed out some creative ways of being a humanitarian 
actor today, of responding to the challenges of humanitarian work, and of engaging 
with people in need. The concept of ethics discussed here is not one that tells right 
from wrong, good from bad. Nor does it pretend to distinguish between what one 
should and should not do, and determine how one should behave. Rather, and as 
Michel Foucault powerfully asked in an interview a few months before his death in 
1984, ‘what is morality, if not the practice of liberty, the deliberate practice of liberty?’ 
(Fornet-Betancourt, Becker, and Gomez-Müller, 1987, p. 115). Ultimately, this was 
precisely the object of this paper: the exercise of one’s freedom, one’s own agency, in 
the context of humanitarian action. 
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Endnotes
1 The notions of ethics and morality are understood differently in the English- and French-speaking 
traditions. As this paper navigates between the two, however, it makes no distinction between 
them and uses them interchangeably. Both are viewed as attempts to answer the general questions 
regarding how we shall live and what we shall do.
2 The author’s translation from French.
3 The author’s translation from French.
4 For an analysis of this neglect in development studies, see for example Fechter (2012).
5 See http://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-product (last accessed on 23 March 2017).
6 This paper stresses the difference between them in order to distinguish them; however, a more 
nuanced analysis would be necessary to be true to the way in which ‘speaking words’ and ‘spoken 
words’ relate intrinsically to each other. Indeed, the latter constitute the set of already existing 
meanings with and through which the former emerges. There is thus a fundamental and mutually 
constitutive relationship between these two modes of speaking. 
7 The 2015 edition of the State of the Humanitarian Sector defines the humanitarian sector as ‘the 
network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian 
assistance is provided when local and national resources are insufficient to meet the needs of the 
affected population’ (ALNAP, 2015, p. 18). For a study of organisational culture see, for instance, 
the work of Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) on Médecins Sans Frontières. 
8 The author’s translation from French.
9 Unless otherwise specified, all quotes are extracted from interviews with humanitarian actors con-
ducted in Beirut in June 2014. 
10 Italics are those of the author. 
11 It would be interesting to compare this humanitarian culture with other caregiving sectors, such 
as social work, or healthcare professions in national services and see if there is a similar dominat-
ing culture of concern.
12 For a discussion of differences and similarities beween the business and humanitarian sectors see 
Hopgood (2008).
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13 It is not possible to provide evidence of this here, yet the tone of the voice when saying these words, 
particularly the emphasis on concern and empathy, is also revealing of the fact that they belong 
more to a particular moral culture than emerging from the individual’s moral sense. 
14 The author’s translation from French. It is interesting to note that this asymmetry has led to opposite 
analyses. In the North American context, these analyses were led by care ethicists studying activities 
performed primarily by migrant workers and women, such as cleaning, nannying, or nursing. These 
studies essentially aimed to revalorise these depreciated roles. In the French context, by contrast, 
analyses of this constitutive asymmetry mainly involved a Foucaultian lens and focused on apprais-
ing power in institutions of care, such as psychiatric or educative establishments. While the latter 
looked at abuses of power by the ‘carer’, the former examined these abuses on the side of the ‘cared-
for’ (this abuse is identified in this paper as a lack of recognition).
15 See, for example, the Seven Fundamental Principles of the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) proclaimed in 1965, the Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief prepared jointly by the IFRC and the 
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) in 1994, the Code of Good Practice in the Manage-
ment and Support of Aid Personnel produced by People In Aid in 1997 (revised in 2003), the 23 Princi-
ples and Good Practice for Humanitarian Donorship released by Good Humanitarian Donorship in 2003, 
and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability published by the CHS Alliance, 
Groupe URD, and the Sphere Project in 2014.
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